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Abstract: Land tenure and carbon rights constitute critical issues to take into account in 
achieving emission reductions, ensuring transparent benefit sharing and determining  
non-permanence (or non-compliance) liabilities in the context of REDD+ strategies and 
projects. This is so because tenure systems influence who becomes involved in efforts to 
avoid deforestation and improve forest management, and that land tenure, carbon rights 
and liabilities may be linked or divorced with implications for rural development. This 
paper explores these issues by looking at tenure regimes and carbon rights issues in Mexico, 
Brazil and Costa Rica. It is effectively shown that complex bundles of rights over forest 
resources have distinct implications for REDD+ design and implementation, and that 
REDD+ strategies in selected countries have to date failed in procedurally addressing  
land-use conflicts and carbon rights entitlements and liabilities. 
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1. Introduction 
Incentivizing reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks and sustainably managing forests (REDD+) 
has emerged as a key international strategy to halt land-use change in developing countries and involve 
them in climate change mitigation efforts [1]. Developing countries‘ REDD+ strategies are likely to 
involve diverse and combined policies and measures. These should address the drivers of deforestation 
and may include diverse options, such as agricultural intensification, improved forest management or 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) [2]. However, these options will be by no means easy to 
implement and may face governance challenges across political, social and geographical scales, 
including corruption and contradictory policy and market incentives [3-5]. 
This paper argues that some of the most important challenges for REDD+ will be related to the role 
of land tenure and carbon rights in achieving emission reductions, ensuring transparent benefit sharing 
and determining non-permanence (or non-compliance) liabilities. Land tenure systems are made up of 
social relations, including property rights in favor of individuals, communities, organizations or the 
state; these relationships influence who gets access to and exercises control over land and forest 
resources. These relations increasingly involve claims over the ownership of ecosystem services, 
particularly since market-based approaches to conservation have been popularized through forest 
carbon and biodiversity markets [6,7]. It is our view, however, that such issues have been addressed 
rather shallowly in the literature to date, with studies focusing predominantly, if not exclusively, on the 
likely effects of tenure (in)security in shaping the outcomes of REDD+ policies and measures. 
Furthermore, we believe that existing analyses have also failed to explain the particularities of forest 
tenure regimes in developing countries and discuss how such regimes are likely to shape REDD+ 
design and implementation, including how they will attribute carbon rights and liabilities.  
This paper addresses this gap by drawing on the analysis of forest tenure regimes in three Latin 
American countries (Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica). These countries were chosen for their divergent 
land-use history and tenure systems, as well contrasting positions in REDD+ international negotiations. 
They present similarities and differences in their strategies to halting deforestation and degradation and 
defining who is entitled to carbon rights and may be responsible for future carbon losses. We maintain 
that tenure systems influence who becomes involved in efforts to reduce deforestation and degradation, 
conserve forests and improve forest management, and that land tenure, carbon rights and liabilities 
may be linked or divorced with implications for rural development. Where landownership and carbon 
rights coincide, landowners would see the economic value of their forests increase and would be 
potentially able to access a new financial asset to complement (or substitute) existing income streams. 
On the contrary, if carbon is considered a public, state-controlled commodity, the long-term 
commitment that the generation of REDD+ credits implies will irremediably affect landowners‘ land 
use options. In this case REDD+ incentives may not reach—or reach only partially and indirectly, 
through governmental programs—rural actors, including the most disadvantaged who live within or 
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next to forested areas, such as indigenous communities and forest-dependent villages and dwellers [8]. 
The state—and not the particular landowners—would be held responsible for carbon losses before the 
international community.  
This article has four main objectives, namely (1) review the role that land tenure and its associated 
―bundles of rights‖ play in deforestation and degradation processes; (2) explain how tenure rights are 
defined and exercised (or not) in our selected countries; (3) highlight the countries‘ involvement in 
REDD+, and outline how tenure and carbon rights issues have been considered; and (4) discuss the 
implications of tenure regimes and carbon rights for REDD+ design and implementation. In doing so, 
it is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical and research context, by conceptualizing 
tenure and property issues, highlighting the implications of tenure systems and tenure reform for 
REDD+, and discussing the interactions between tenure regimes, carbon rights, liabilities and benefit 
sharing in REDD+. Section 3 presents a brief review of the selected countries‘ tenure regimes and 
deforestation trends, while Section 4 highlights their historical and present approach to REDD+ at 
international and national levels. Section 5 discusses the implications of the countries‘ tenure regimes 
and REDD+ strategies as developed to date for three key related issues: enforcement challenges, 
legitimacy and benefit-sharing, and carbon rights attribution and liabilities. Section 6 summarizes and 
concludes the article.  
2. The Role of Land Tenure and Property Rights in REDD+ 
2.1. Conceptualizing Tenure and Property 
Land tenure systems are critical to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of REDD+  
strategies [9-12]. Land tenure can be defined as the right, whether defined in customary or statutory 
terms, that determines who can hold and use land (including forests and other landscapes) and 
resources, for how long, and under what conditions [10]. Tenure encompasses both property rights, 
understood as social relationships that contain enforceable claims to rights in something, and informal 
relations governing access to, use of and exclusion from resources, and involving potentially multiple 
authorities [13]. This distinction between formally sanctionable property rights and informal relations 
around natural resource management is important because, on the one hand, it recognizes that property 
is only property if socially legitimate institutions sanction it, and politico-legal institutions are only 
effectively legitimized if their interpretation of social norms is heeded [14]. On the other hand, it 
underscores the fact that other forms of accessing and benefitting from natural resources transcend 
formal property rights and may rely on other forms of authority and legitimacy [15]. 
Property rights embrace differentiated ―bundles of rights‖ (i.e., rights of access, withdrawal, 
management, exclusion and alienation) that are mutable over time [16]. Access rights concern the right 
to enter a defined physical property while withdrawal rights allow users to obtain the ―products‖ of a 
resource (e.g., to catch fish, collect firewood, appropriate water); users with management rights have 
the right to establish the rules and sanctions under which the resources can be managed; users with 
exclusion rights can determine who has access and withdrawal rights; and, finally, users with 
alienation rights have the right to transfer their acquired rights to other parties. This differentiation 
allows identifying five different types of property rights holders depending on the number of claims 
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they can make over a particular resource: (1) the authorized entrant holding access rights only; (2) the 
authorized user with both access and withdrawal rights; (3) the claimant, with access, withdrawal and 
management rights; (4) the proprietor, with all but alienation rights; and (5) the owner, who holds all 
―bundles of rights‖ [16]. 
Tenure systems can in turn be grouped in four categories depending on the nature of underlying 
property rights [17]. Open access systems are those in which access to natural resources is unregulated 
and open to everyone (such as the atmosphere), and where it is difficult, costly, or almost impossible to 
establish rules of exclusion and regulation across resource users. State and public property implies that 
the state is the only institution with the legitimacy to vest access rights and management quotas over 
the resource to other users. Usually, the general public has equal rights to the resource and the state has 
coercive powers of enforcement. The government can establish regulations for sustainable resource use, 
but such regulations can be extremely costly to monitor and, as a result, become ineffective. In fact, 
public property is often unsuccessful in ensuring exclusion, and informal access to resources prevails. In 
many others instances, however, public property can de facto be used by individuals, organizations 
and/or communities who may hold long-term access and withdrawal rights over specific resources. 
Private property refers to situations in which individuals and families hold full rights over land and 
rely on state-based political and legal institutions to recognize and enforce their property claims. 
Private property holders have the right to exclude others from resources but the legitimacy of such 
rights would determine the costs of exclusion. Furthermore, property, particularly in forests, is often 
subject to regulations that in practice constrain how owners can manage their resources. Finally, 
common property regimes bring together a group of resource users who share collective ownership 
over a territory, or over a single environmental resource. These users share rights of access to and 
management of natural resources and rely on both community and state-based authorities to assert their 
claims, establish management rules and exclude outsiders, while the state retains alienation rights. 
Many traditional and indigenous rural communities manage their resources in common but their 
―bundles of rights‖ over such resources can be socially differentiated and regulated by customary 
practices and community institutions. Members of a common property regime can also hold full or 
partial private property rights over farming and grazing lands, which in some cases may be transferable 
to third parties, depending on legal and customary provisions [18]. 
2.2. Implications of Tenure Systems and Tenure Reform for REDD+ 
The property systems introduced above constitute somewhat rigid categories, and many situations 
in practice tend to combine different ―bundles of rights‖ across different tenure systems that coexist in 
specific contexts. Forest tenure regimes, in particular, are often characterized by multiple claims on 
access rights, and competing relations about how to manage resources and who to exclude. For 
example, within a forest landscape formally owned by the state there may be local groups or 
communities who have allocated customary property rights over specific trees and non-timber forest 
products to their members, while at the same time confronting settled migrants who are claiming 
exclusive rights over specific forest areas. The state may also have embedded interests in these 
landscapes, mainly for forest conservation, thus resulting in complex situations of contested rights. 
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Some studies suggest that between 65% and 76% of developing countries‘ forests remain formally 
owned and administered by governments, even though the number of hectares being devolved to local 
communities, indigenous groups and private actors has increased significantly over the last decade 
through tenure reforms and the recognition of indigenous territories [19-21]. However, data on forest 
ownership should be interpreted cautiously because it varies across sources and countries. A recent 
study of tenure systems in 39 tropical countries showed that while in Latin America only 43% of 
forests are owned by the state, this increases to 68% and 97% in Asia and Africa respectively. Looking 
into the detail, 7% of Latin American state-owned forests are managed by local communities under 
formal usufruct agreements, while communities and indigenous peoples control up to 25% and private 
actors 32% of public forests [22]. 
Landscapes in which contested rights predominate can in part be explained by colonial and 
postcolonial history, which led states to control access to forests, and grant rights to private and  
state-controlled logging concessionaires as a way to increase national earnings, thus ignoring the 
existence of communities and indigenous peoples [23]. In many countries, especially in tropical 
regions, these contested landscapes have also been shaped by persistent agricultural frontier expansion, 
in which diverse actors, sometimes with active state intervention, compete to take advantage of timber 
resources and clear the forest as a way to claim land ownership rights [24,25]. This process has created 
conflicts with rural populations who held customary tenure but also among those who have tried (and 
continue) to appropriate land. As noted above, in many countries and regions the situation has 
improved due to significant land tenure reforms aimed at clarifying property rights and recognizing the 
rights of indigenous peoples, particularly since the 1980s [26]. However, we also recognize that these 
reforms have sometimes proved insufficient, leading to the emergence of grassroots movements that 
occupy land and claim for land re-distribution [27]. 
The most common tenure models adopted to formalize tenure rights in Latin America include 
individual private land holdings, indigenous territories, extractive reserves, agro-extractive and 
forestry settlements and social or community concessions [26]. While they entail granting different 
types of rights, all these models share two main characteristics. The first is that the state has granted 
rights with the condition that forests are sustainably managed and preserved, with each model subject 
to its own specific regulations. The second is that the state has often retained alienation rights on its 
lands, so that forests cannot be transferred or purchased by third parties and thus privatized. These 
conditions are often related to the governments‘ interest in biodiversity conservation and climate 
change mitigation, often influenced by international policies and treaties. This suggests that tenure 
systems are shaped by history, geography and the political context and that their configuration responds 
to the existence of customary claims, the way tenure reforms are implemented, and governments‘ 
policies and discourses on forest conservation and use. 
REDD+ strategies thus unfold in such a context of evolving tenure systems. Consequently, any 
regulation aimed at promoting sustainable forest management and conservation will have to take into 
account the existing formal and informal rights over forest resources, and the role of the relevant 
sanctioning authorities. The lack of tenure security has been considered a key element hindering the 
development of REDD+ interventions [28], while it has been critically acknowledged that such 
interventions run the risk of excluding some categories of formal forest users and informal  
tenants [29]. Some have therefore suggested that REDD+ strategies should support communities and 
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indigenous territories by reorganizing tenure relations for the benefit of their poorest members [30]. It 
has also been claimed that extending forest tenure reform can help ―to protect people whose rights 
must be usurped if REDD+ leads to a rush in command and control measures to protect forests, or if 
REDD+ leads to a resource race when the value of forests increases‖ [10]. Some have even suggested 
that securing tenure can have additional benefits such as reducing land-use change and, in the long 
term, increasing reforestation and conservation [31]. 
Extending forest tenure reforms, however, does not guarantee that REDD+ is implemented 
legitimately and effectively. The concept of land reform itself has been heavily contested, particularly 
when it consists of top-down approaches through which governments formalize tenure rights through 
communal demarcation and granting individual property rights only. This has been criticized as a 
mechanism that guarantees a title but not much else [32] and that it is incapable of dealing with 
complex webs of access to natural resources [33] or of empowering particular actors in their struggles 
to gain control over natural resources [18,34]. When it comes to environmental outcomes, land reform 
programs have also shown mixed results. Tenure security programs in Papua New Guinea and Peru, 
for example, have not fostered conservation because the right to allocate timber and development 
concessions for roads and mining has remained in the hands of the state [20]. There is also extensive 
evidence that securing tenure can lead to increased degradation and deforestation if it is not conditional 
on conservation commitments or it is not accompanied by changes in policy incentives to reduce 
profits derived from continuous deforestation and subsequent land uses [35-38]. 
2.3. Tenure’s Effect on Carbon Rights, Liabilities and Benefit Sharing in REDD+ 
Land tenure regimes increasingly encompass ownership claims over ecosystem services, and such 
claims may also evolve and be contested [39]. Evidence from carbon forestry projects, for example, 
suggests that collective ownership can result in carbon revenues being distributed in favor of those 
households with more available capital, disposable labor and more active participation in project 
activities, and against actors who lack resources but nonetheless hold rights over the forest  
commons [6,40]. In most of these projects, landowners have ceded their carbon rights to the project 
developer who has been responsible for selling any carbon credits and sharing any revenues, if 
convened in the contract between parties. When these projects have been implemented under collective 
ownership, the distribution of revenue has fallen outside the developer‘s control, since the authority 
governing the collective has decided what to do with the revenues and whether such revenues should 
or should not be shared with informal tenants or settled migrants [41]. This demonstrates that formal 
and informal right holders can get involved in (or become excluded from) carbon commodification and 
any future benefit streams deriving from ecosystem services. 
In the context of REDD+, it is important to differentiate between the actual nature of the incentives 
provided to landowners by specific policies or measures, and the economic nature of REDD+ 
incentives as realized by governments once emission reductions or increases in carbon stocks have 
occurred and have been internationally verified. This distinction suggests, on the one hand, that 
REDD+ policies and measures may or not include direct payments for sustainable resource use and 
conservation (e.g., through PES systems) and, on the other, that such payments and the actual 
consecution of carbon revenues by governments are temporally and spatially detached. They are 
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temporally detached because policies and measures that entail compensation are likely to involve some 
degree of upfront support to increase landowners‘ interest and participation, while REDD+ incentives are 
likely to be realized only once emission reductions and increases in carbon stocks have been effectively 
achieved. They are spatially detached because the former should be transferred to and potentially be 
made conditional on local and regional forest management and conservation improvements, while 
REDD+ benefits are likely to depend on overall emission reductions at national level. 
Such existing temporal and spatial separation between the realization of carbon benefits at local 
level and the actual benefits achieved by governments at national level can in turn be related to carbon 
ownership and liability issues. We acknowledge, however, that ―conservation of forest carbon stocks‖ 
as currently referred to in the REDD+ framework (i.e., the support to keep areas of forests which are 
neither actively managed nor at risk of deforestation and degradation) should be excluded from 
liability discussions because it does not imply reductions in emissions or increases in sequestration and, 
as such, no future carbon credits should be attached to these activities. International negotiations will 
presumably favor the development of fund-based instruments detached from markets to support these 
activities in those countries where they are more relevant (e.g., India and Costa Rica). 
In the remaining REDD+ options (i.e., reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation, 
sustainable management and enhancement of forest stocks), if governments are supposed to receive 
financial compensation once emission reductions or the enhancement of carbon stocks have been 
realized through the sale of REDD+ credits to developed countries and/or to other international buyers, 
then it would seem logical for governments to retain the rights over any carbon rights from forests. In 
practice, this would mean enforcing regulations in public forests to halt land-use change and support 
sustainable forest management through specific actions in particular territories, which may or may not 
involve direct payments to landowners as suggested above. If an economic compensation approach is 
adopted, for example through PES programs, then the government could also decide whether payments 
should be related to carbon prices in international markets and actual sequestration rates, or if they 
should just consist of more or less flat economic incentives defined by local opportunity costs or other 
parameters. Additionally, if governments claim ownership over forest carbon, they are consequently 
assuming the responsibility for any future losses, without excluding the possibility of prosecuting 
landowners who had committed to halt land-use change and/or enhance carbon stocks through public 
funding programs and then failed to meet their commitments. To date, however, public prosecution 
against landowners in PES programs has been minimal if not impossible to undertake, due to the 
transaction and political costs involved [42]. 
Governments, nonetheless, could also consider carbon as no different from other resources such as 
trees or non-timber forest products. In this way, carbon would become an asset for actors holding  
long-term usufruct rights in public forests, for communities holding collective titles and for private 
forest owners, and it would be considered a public resource only in those forests directly and uniquely 
administered by the state. Tenure and carbon rights would thus become intrinsically linked to each 
other and a multiplicity of systems for realizing the value of carbon may evolve across geographical 
and administrative scales. One could find, for example, a country where indigenous communities 
ceded their carbon rights through a private contract to an international NGO to be sold through 
voluntary carbon markets, while the government developed a national PES program for indigenous 
territories under which carbon rights from participating communities effectively belonged to the 
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government. In the former case, the government could even decide to retain some of the benefits from 
REDD+ local projects by, for example, taxing transactions as some countries have done in the case of 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol [43]. The larger the number and 
diversity of initiatives commodifying carbon in a country, the more diverse the systems for defining 
and allocating carbon rights and liabilities will be. Such diversity will also translate into carbon 
accounting and verification challenges, as the government will be responsible for avoiding double 
counting and responding transparently to international commitments [12]. 
We turn now to offer a brief picture of the most recent history of land and forest tenure in our 
selected countries and by doing so we lay the foundations to understand present REDD+ developments 
and their implications on land management and forest rights. 
3. Historical Insights on Land and Forest Tenure in Selected Countries 
3.1. Mexico’s Social Forests 
The origins of the current Mexican land tenure system are found in the Mexican Revolution of the 
1910s and Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution. This Article noted that all lands and waters originally 
belonged to the nation and that the nation would grant private property rights under certain conditions. 
It capped the size of private properties, parceled large private landholdings and, above all, allowed 
rural communities and groups of families to be granted rights to land in order to meet their 
development needs or to restore customary rights held before the nineteenth century [44]. However, 
not all post-revolutionary governments showed the same commitment to land redistribution. As shown 
elsewhere [44-46], the share of social property increased every year until 1982 but re-distribution was 
only pursued significantly during the second half of the 1930s, the mid 1960s and the early  
1970s [44,45]. As of today, private lands owned and/or managed by companies, sharecroppers, and 
landless peasants represent 37% of the Mexican agrarian landscape but only encompass 26% of the 
country‘s forests [47,48]. Public lands, in turn, belong to federal or regional public agencies, as well as 
to public enterprises; these lands represent more than 8% of the agrarian landscape and cover 4% of 
forested areas, primarily including protected areas and bodies of water [48]. Finally, social property 
encompasses agrarian communities and ejidos that together represent 52% of the Mexican agrarian 
landscape [47] and approximately control 70% of the forests [48]. 
The rights of agrarian communities derive from those recognized by the Spanish Crown to original 
settlers. These communities generally, but not always consist of indigenous people who have 
historically inhabited a region and share language, traditions and governing institutions. Agrarian 
communities hold forests and pastures in common while individual rights holders—known as 
comuneros—have all but alienation rights over their farming plots, which ultimately belong to the 
community and cannot be transferred outside the group. Community life, including forest regulation, is 
governed by a communal assembly made up of all comuneros—some of whom may be women—and a 
council of authorities renewed periodically, normally every three years. Ejidos, in turn, are a specific 
product of the agrarian reform, constituted when a group of families claimed rights over a territory to 
which, for example, they had migrated to. Claimants received a parcel of land, which remained under 
communal ownership, with no rental or land sales allowed. Right holders—known as ejidatarios—can 
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only bequeath access rights to their land to a single descendant and ejidos usually keep an area of 
forest and pasture managed in common, to which all community members have access for grazing, 
fuelwood collection and timber harvesting. The latter is often organized through community members 
and groups, or external concessions, with extraction quotas and any correspondent benefits defined and 
distributed through the ejido assembly and/or the council of authorities. Both agrarian communities 
and ejidos have members who have been allocated a parcel to farm and another to build their house but 
who do not have rights to benefit from the forest, the so-called avecindados. 
In 1991–1992, the constitutional reform of Article 27 implied that no further land was going to be 
distributed among rural people, and therefore started what some labeled the ―second agrarian  
reform‖ [49] and others the ―neoliberal turn‖ in Mexican agrarian development [50]. The reform 
legalized and encouraged the formation of joint ventures of communities and ejidos with private 
capital and an accompanying agrarian law provided the means for comuneros and ejidatarios to 
become private owners and to rent and sell their land to third parties. These reforms also sought to 
legalize informal property rights and to stimulate rural investment by allowing ejidatarios and 
comuneros to use their holdings as collateral for raising capital. The forest commons, however, could 
not be subdivided in individual parcels and sold, thus remaining excluded from privatization [51,52]. 
A land rights certification program (PROCEDE) designed to resolve boundary conflicts, regularize 
tenure, and issue property rights certificates seconded the 1992 reforms. The latest official statistics 
show that there are over 30,000 communities and ejidos in the country, occupying over 50% of the 
total national territory; 94% of them joined PROCEDE and benefited more than four million farmers 
(see Table 1) [53]. However, most of these farmers opted to obtain only proprietorial rights over their 
actual parceled land and only 0.33% of social property became privatized. The certified land area 
represents 86% of all social property and 6% of the agrarian nuclei are still not interested in delimiting 
their property due to political and illegal interests [54]. Relevant for this paper is to highlight that land 
conflicts remain a problem in about two million ha of social property, the forests of which are often 
disputed within or across indigenous groups and between indigenous and non-indigenous communities. 
Consequently, the government has set up special tribunals to force the resolution of many  
long-standing conflicts [55]. 
Table 1. Historical progress of PROCEDE (in hectares), 1993 to 2006 (Adapted from [52]). 
 National total Procede total Percent (%) 
Nuclei 30,513 28,757 94 
Beneficiaries (individuals holding title 
of parceled land/private property) 
 4,445,213  
Parceled land certified  25,851,329.7370 25.44 
Common land certified  62,400,843.3458 61.42 
Titled and privatized  332,484.1365 0.33 
Land 101,591,095 88,584,657.2193 87 
Since the early years of the agrarian revolution to the late 1970s then, the share of land controlled 
by Mexican communities and ejidos progressively increased. This, however, did not translate into a 
more autonomous control of forest resources. Under the Forest Law of 1942, for example, these were 
placed at the service of industrial development through the establishment and promotion of forest 
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concessionaires—with concessions set for 25 years or more—while communities were only given the 
option of selling timber to such concessionaries or not using forest resources at all [56]. Forest 
companies established heavy restrictions on forest user groups, and public force was used to impose 
and enforce such measures while payments for timber were managed by the agrarian state agency and 
often never reached the communities [56]. Furthermore, in areas where forests were not commercially 
valuable, the enactment of numerous forestry bans during the 1950s also impacted negatively on 
communities‘ ability to benefit from forestry resources, thus contributing to an ―open access‖ forest 
resources‘ situation that favored illegal logging [56]. During the 1960s and 1970s, the state heavily 
subsidized agriculture and ranching activities, encouraging farmers to reduce the size of their forest 
commons, colonize tropical forests and cultivate on marginal lands using new agricultural inputs. In 
parallel, the 1960 Forest Law sanctioned the creation of state-owned forestry companies but any 
existent ones were granted new forest concessions. The government further increased its control over 
forest resources, defining logging permits, stumpage fees, and timber transport and commercialization 
chains, among others. Generally speaking, this translated into a situation of ―highly ambiguous‖ 
communal forest rights, with the state appropriating most of the benefits [56].  
Community forestry took off in the 1980s in response to the government‘s efforts to liberalize the 
Mexican economy and reduce the presence of the state in the forestry sector. The 1986 Forest Law 
represented a turning point in Mexican history, insofar as it ―abolished forestry concessions and 
recognized the rights of local communities to manage their forest resources‖ and it considered 
communities central actors within the forest sector [56]. Community forestry has been consolidating 
ever since, with ―ups and downs‖ in terms of government financial support. Unfortunately, however, 
the illegal logging networks and corruption characterizing the concessionaires and forest bans‘ period 
still exist in many locations [57]. Recent studies indicate that, during the period 1992–2002,  
2,300 ejidos and communities—representing nearly 15% of the 15,800 communities with significant 
forest commons—acquired permits to engage in commercial logging. Most of these only used 25% of 
their standing forests for harvesting and left the rest for other purposes [58]. Community forestry has 
also contributed to enact strict regulations to combat illegal logging, control fires and halt degradation 
and deforestation processes at community level [58]. Bray and colleagues, for example, show that 
communities can perform as well as protected areas in supporting forest conservation under low 
colonization pressures [59], and others highlight that shared economic interests in timber and other 
forest resources, combined with strong governance and shared ethnicity, are key explanatory factors of 
community conservation [60]. 
Since 1986 to the present day, another three Forest Laws were passed in 1992, 1997 and 2003  
(see [61] for a review). The most recent was pushed by the newly created National Forestry 
Commission (i.e., CONAFOR, for its Spanish acronym), a decentralized agency from the Environment 
Ministry, and together contributed to substantially increase the budget of the forestry sector, the 
number of available forest management options eligible for funding—increasing the incentives for 
social forestry development—and, importantly for the REDD+ context, to establish the foundations for 
the establishment of a number of programs of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) [56,61]. 
Nonetheless, as Bray and colleagues argue [61], the increasing strength of the social forestry sector in 
Mexico should be explained not so much by the most recent Forest Laws but by the relative stability of 
the agrarian reform process, which lasted for several decades and allowed for the substantial allocation 
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of natural capital to local communities and the emergence of context-specific forms of community 
forestry enterprises. Forestry Laws, and their accompanying programs, should thus be regarded as the 
framework through which some forestry development options have been prioritized over others 
depending on the political and economic context, and as instruments through which the state 
establishes forest management and environmental regulations. 
Communities‘ increasing control of forest resources during the last three decades, however, has not 
translated into a significant decrease in deforestation rates. From 1976–2000, Mexico was among the 
most deforested countries in the world, with average deforestation rates of 86,718 ha/year for 
temperate forests and 263,570 ha/year for tropical forests, while the total annual loss for all ecosystem 
types averaged 545,000 ha/year [62]. Deforestation and degradation patterns are explained by  
multi-faceted and often combined factors, such as urban and population growth [45], the government‘s 
inability to tackle migratory processes into protected areas of high biodiversity value, particularly in 
the country‘s tropical regions [63], the inability of some communities to establish sustainable forestry 
management plans, arrest clandestine logging and reduce overgrazing [64], the expansion of 
commercial, export-based agriculture [65], and the mismanagement of forest resources as a result of 
ill-designed conservation and development partnerships in protected areas [66].  
In summary, the process of land redistribution that started in the late 1910s and ended in the early 
1990s transformed the Mexican landscape to the point where, as of today, over 50% of the country‘s 
territory lies in the hands of rural communities that in turn control most forests (i.e., approximately 
70%). The original claimants of social property and their descendants have always held access, 
withdrawal, management and exclusion rights over their agricultural plots but, since the 1990s reform, 
they have also been able to extend such rights to become private property right holders, which has 
been rarely the case to date. Communities‘ ―bundles of rights‖ of rights over the forest commons, 
however, have been ambiguous, shaped by the local context and shifting considerable over time 
depending on government regulations and broader macro-economic circumstances. Many communities 
had their withdrawal, management and exclusion rights over forests heavily constrained by forest 
concessionaries and conservation policies during most of the last hundred years, and only since the mid 
1980s their key role as forest managers was acknowledged. Even so, their present ability to manage and 
benefit from their forests is still constrained by the state that controls their decisions through 
management and financial regulations.  
3.2. Brazil’s Competing Land Claims 
Brazil‘s land tenure regimes have also evolved from colonial times, when large land grants (known 
as ―sesmarias‖) were granted by the Portuguese Crown to followers of the royal court, usually traders 
or lesser nobility, on the condition that they developed those lands for productive use and paid tributes. 
After the abolition of slavery in 1888, former slaves were also allowed to occupy untitled inland 
territories, making claims founded on use rights. Clearing as proof of effective occupation became 
tantamount to ownership [67]. Nevertheless, due to overlapping jurisdictions, competing claims and 
outright usurpation by grileiros (i.e., land grabbers), multi-tiered titles to the same property often still 
exist today. Some municipalities in the Amazon region, for example, have titled properties that far 
exceed the effective area of their jurisdictions. 
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Since the 1850s, through the enactment of the Lei de Terras (i.e., Brazil‘s land law), Brazilian 
public lands could be removed from the category of ―devolute‖ to private status through a specific 
administrative act. This artifice was widely used to formalize land tenure and it was widely used in 
frontier territories to cede lands to private investors and public authorities engaged in colonization and 
land reform projects from the early 1970s onwards [68,69]. Brazil has been the tropical country with 
the highest level of forestlands devolution from nominally government-administered to social and 
private ownership during the last decade. Between 2002 and 2008, the amount of collectively managed 
and owned forests has increased 119% and 48%, respectively. The amount owned by individuals and 
organizations has tripled [22,70]. 
The Legal Amazon region in Brazil—consisting of all or part of the states of Acre, Amapá, 
Amazonas, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins—contains nearly half of 
the world‘s remaining tropical rainforest, as well as significant areas of cerrado  
(i.e., savanna lands, forested or not). In contrast with Mexico, forest tenure in the Brazilian Amazon is 
divided only between private (24%) and public lands (76%). The former encompass forests owned by 
individuals and organizations, while the latter include protected areas (40.3%)—encompassing 
indigenous lands (21.7%), sustainable use areas (10.8%) and exclusively protected areas (7.8%)—land 
reform settlements (5.3%) and forests under dispute (30%) (Table 2). This reflects the absence of what 
could be described as a ―social property‖ sector in Brazil‘s land tenure structure comparable to the 
ejidos in Mexico. Nevertheless, the recent constitutional recognition of territorial rights of traditional 
communities such as quilombolas and the continuing demarcation of indigenous lands suggest that 
social property exists, not as a result of land reform to ―socialize‖ property rights, but rather from a 
growing recognition of historical rights of occupation of traditional users within the framework of 
public land ownership. 
Table 2. Land tenure in the Brazilian Legal Amazon region. 
Land tenure category [source] Surface (km
2
) Percentage of total (%) 
Private lands [72] 1,201,516 24.0 
Public lands: 3,804,801 76.0 
- indigenous lands [71] 1,085,890 21.7 
- under sustainable use * [71] 538,128 10.8 
- strictly protected areas [71] 388,798 7.8 
- land reform settlements [72] 265,335 5.3 
- undefined/contested [72] 1,521,920 30.4 
Total  5,006,317 100 
* Includes sustainable use protected areas such as extractive reserves and environmental protection areas. 
Despite the long-standing history of distribution of property rights to landed classes and other right 
seekers from the 1850s, the history of land reform in Brazil is far more recent than that in Mexico. The 
National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) was only created in the 1970s as a 
means to delimit lands for directed colonization or expropriation to satisfy the ―social function of 
property‖, which is constitutionally defined. Since re-democratization in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, INCRA along with state land authorities have sought to resolve land conflicts spurred by 
occupations by landless peoples‘ movements (e.g., Movimento dos Sem Terra—MST) [27]. Often such 
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occupations occurred in areas defined as ―unproductive‖ that served as a reserve of value for the 
wealthy but in other cases they occurred on lands with forest cover. In the latter case, it may be debatable 
if their expropriation and redistribution serves ―the social function of property‖, and therein lies a key 
issue in current REDD+ discussions in the country.  
Private landowners in Brazil are required by the 1964 Forest Code to keep a fixed proportion—
differentiated by biome—in the form of a Legal Reserve, to be managed sustainably for timber and 
non-timber products. In most of the country, this proportion is 20%, though not strictly observed. In 
the Amazon biome (i.e., that part of Brazil which is covered by tropical humid forests, covering nearly 
half of the Brazilian territory) the Legal Reserve share was adjusted administratively in the late 1990s 
from 50% to 80% for environmental protection reasons. Congressional dispute of the decree that 
altered this requirement has raged ever since, having come to a head during 2010 with a proposed 
thorough revamping of the Forest Code. If the rural propertied class has its way, Congress would roll 
back the legal reserve requirement in the Amazon to 50%, provide amnesty for those who have 
deforested beyond the permissible share, and it would permit landowners to make productive use of 
areas formerly subject to more rigorous environmental protection, such as steep hillsides and hilltops 
(substitute bill to Projeto Lei (Poder Legislativo) 1.876/1999). Such a ruling would have disastrous 
implications for Brazil‘s commitments for REDD+, as it would stimulate significant additional 
deforestation, effectively raising Brazil‘s baseline permitted emissions level. 
Forest privatization in the Amazon will in all probability expand considerably in coming years as 
public lands at the frontier become subject to title regularization in accordance with a controversial 
recent initiative that aims to regularize land claims of small to medium squatters who had occupied 
public lands in ―good faith‖ (Law 11 952/2009) [73]. Furthermore, a recent 2007 law on Public Forest 
Management allowed long-term forest concessions to be established within public lands. Some have 
claimed that the law could become an instrument to privatize the remaining Amazon forests and 
provide long-term forest concessions to private, national or foreign companies. In fact, the law 
maintains such forests in the public domain but aims to encourage long-term sustained yields through 
secure tenure and the oversight of a newly created Brazilian Forest Service. Such concessions would 
only be permitted once areas more appropriate for permanent protection and community resource use 
had been circumscribed (Law 11 284/2006). 
The state theoretically exercises a strict control of those communities that have gained access to 
land through agrarian reforms by enforcing the development of land-use plans. In some cases, legal 
reserves have been established as common management areas in such settlements but such reserves are 
often designated on individuals‘ own plots and are often subject to unrestricted use. Indigenous and 
riverine communities have greater autonomy but they also show mixed results regarding tenure 
conflict and sustainable resource management. In the case of those legally recognized indigenous areas, 
for example, tribal management prevails and no other uses are encouraged. They are subject to 
oversight by the National Indian Agency (FUNAI) and the strength of its organization and the 
resources generated by its own activities—timber extraction and mining are formally prohibited—very 
often influence the extent to which encroachment is kept at bay. When this has not been possible, 
conflict over access to forest resources with external actors persists.  
Communities living within sustainable use protected areas or indirect use areas are subject to 
additional regulations that shape their ―bundles of rights‖. These include sustainable use management 
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plans that should in theory assure local development but often result too restrictive, thus undermining 
common property resource management institutions. Government regulations can also act against 
conservation by undermining local rights claims and indirectly favoring the illegal appropriation of 
forest resources. In some extractive reserves, for example, the government‘s failure to oversee 
regulations and prevent incursions, combined with restrictions on communities‘ agency, has led to 
increasing pressures from illegal mining, logging and cattle ranching activities [22]. 
Brazilian tenure regimes, and particularly those in the Amazon region, are thus affected by multiple 
claims and conflicts over resources [32,74]. Conflicts are common between timber extraction 
companies and local communities, as well as between local communities and cattle ranchers. There are 
also conflicts between colonists and communities as the former aim to take control over indigenous or 
informally occupied lands at the frontier [26,75]. It is thus not surprising that deforestation has 
proceeded apace. Although remote sensing data is too coarse to establish clear responsibility, the vast 
majority of deforestation has occurred since the 1970s, at a scale larger than can be accounted for by 
shifting agriculture alone. Total regional deforestation is estimated to have averaged nearly two million 
ha/year from 1996 to 2005, according to the government‘s historical REDD+ baseline. Ranching is 
considered responsible for more than 80% of total deforestation, with the remainder due to a 
combination of recent soybean and other crop incursion and urban-industrial occupation, including 
road building and hydroelectric reservoirs. To date, about 18% of the Brazilian Amazon has been put 
to the axe or the torch, and a sizeable additional area—perhaps twice as large—degraded by 
unsustainable logging practices [76].  
3.3. Costa Rica’s Private and State Forests 
Land tenure regimes across the Costa Rican countryside are a product of a historical land-use 
change process, initially for agricultural and cattle ranching, and more recently for the conservation of 
forests and their biological diversity. The colonization of the Costa Rican ―forest frontier‖ was 
encouraged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because formal titling was granted 10 years 
after occupation and cultivation [77]. Such expansion was counteracted by the enactment of ambitious 
conservation and forest policies from the early 1970s onwards, including several forest management 
laws, the provision of incentives for reforestation and conservation, and the development of a system 
of national protected areas that now covers 25% of the country‘s land [77]. 
At present, Costa Rica diverges considerably from Mexico and Brazil, insofar as 55% of the 
country‘s forests are private while the rest is publicly owned. However, the share of forest private 
ownership has decreased from 75% in 1990 to 55% in 2005, while the country has nearly doubled the 
number of public forests—from 24% in 1990 to 45% in 2005 [78]. National parks and biological 
reserves represent 11% of the country and 21% of forest cover. Most of these areas have been directly 
expropriated from forest owners, who have not received the correspondent financial compensation. 
They suffer from a lack of financial, technical and human resources, thus leading to increasing 
encroachment by squatters, illegal loggers, hunters and miners. Protected wilderness areas, composed 
of forest reserves and wildlife refuges, cover 14% of the country and 19% of the forest cover and most 
have been established on private domain lands. In these cases, legislation requires the holder to 
demonstrate possession for at least 10 years before establishing the reserve, which in many cases has 
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been impossible and has led to conflicts. Indigenous reserves, in turn, cover 10% of the country‘s 
forests and they are governed through Indigenous Integral Development Associations (ADIIs, for its 
Spanish acronym). 
The 1996 Forest Law transformed the use of forest resources by re-defining existing ―bundles of 
rights‖ in private and public forests [79]. It represented a turning point in the country‘s land-use 
history because it set prerogatives for forest conservation and sustainable management, including a 
total ban on deforestation and introduced for the first time in Latin America a countrywide PES 
program. In private forests, the law requires owners to acquire harvesting permits for trees and forest 
patches in pasture and agricultural lands and to develop a forest management plan with the obligatory 
involvement of a professional forester. In addition, the Law sets management restrictions on tree 
harvesting along rivers, water springs and steep slopes. On the other hand, it offers incentives for 
reforestation to counteract land-use change. Such over-regulation of private forests, however, 
aggravated by a parallel ban on incentives for natural forest management, has not always resulted in 
positive environmental outcomes [80]. The lack of economic and legal opportunities to create a 
competing forest rent from forests under Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) has led to increased 
land-use change in forests with higher opportunity costs for agriculture but suitable topography and 
relatively good access to markets. Furthermore, the PES program, which has been politically perverted 
by environmental groups to deliver incentives for forest conservation only, is burdened with a package 
of legal constraints and higher costs on administrative and productive activities such as plantation 
forestry and sustainable management of natural forests, leading to lower timber prices, owners‘ 
unwillingness to invest in sustainable logging practices and increased deforestation [81-83]. 
In public forests, the 1996 Forest Law eliminated any rights of access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation in national parks, biological reserves, mangroves, protected areas, wildlife 
refuges and forest reserves. Furthermore, indigenous ADIIs cannot access commercial forest 
management permits because their lands fall outside the scope of the 1996 Forest Law with respect to 
commercial forest management (Decree 26511, 1997) and they can only make use of forest resources 
for domestic consumption [83]. However, they can harvest dead logs and cut timber from agroforestry 
systems as long as these are used within the reserve boundaries. Such restricted access to timber 
markets has had a negative impact on indigenous peoples‘ livelihoods, and it has not translated 
necessarily into an increase in forest cover and biomass. Indigenous reserves show a relatively lower 
percentage of average deforestation than private forests, but higher than protected areas.  
Precisely, deforestation and forest degradation are still prevalent in the country, but to a much lesser 
extent than in Mexico and Brazil. During 2000 and 2005, between 144,398 and 224,406 ha of early and 
medium-aged private forests were lost, mainly driven by the expansion of agricultural and cattle 
ranching activities in young and medium aged forests; the encroachment of migrant settlers in indigenous 
lands; and illegal logging in publicly protected areas and wildlife refuges [83]. However, another 
207,983 to 288,886 ha were regenerated due to increasing densities in existing forests and  
new forest plantations, which makes of Costa Rica a net sink of carbon dioxide in forest ecosystems 
overall [83]. 
We can thus conclude by saying that Costa Rica also presents a complex mosaic of ―bundles of 
rights‖ in both public and private forests, which are also heavily regulated by government provisions 
and particularly by the 1996 Forest Law. As for Brazil, ―social property‖ is not so prevalent and 
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indigenous communities have their forest management rights heavily constrained—to a point in which 
they cannot benefit commercially. Albeit being a net forest carbon sink, Costa Rica also suffers from 
deforestation and degradation and conflicts over land rights are also present. These two processes 
combined have direct implications for REDD+ and the country‘s strategy, which we now outline and 
discuss below.  
4. Perspectives on REDD+, Land Tenure and Carbon Rights 
Mexico has been very active in REDD+ discussions under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), working alongside many other Latin American countries 
to produce joint submissions at a very early stage of the negotiations. Mexico and other Latin 
American parties supported a flexible REDD+ mechanism to allow developing countries to receive 
financial incentives—including through the carbon market—for successful REDD+ actions carried out 
at all levels, from project to national scale, according to each country‘s particular capacities and 
circumstances, building on and including the CDM. This concept was further developed in a 2007 
submission by Paraguay on behalf of Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru and supported by 
Ecuador, in which the idea of a ―nested approach‖ was introduced to the UNFCCC negotiations [84]. 
Mexico has expressed a preference for the coordinated development of REDD+ activities at 
different scales, including project-type efforts to be developed within a national accounting  
system [85]. The identification of REDD+ pilot projects has gained momentum, and government 
agencies and NGOs are working on the design and implementation of regional and local projects. 
Mexico‘s fourth National Communication to the UNFCCC presents some of the projects currently 
being considered for funding by the National Protected Areas Commission, including La Laguna 
Biosphere Reserve in the state of Baja California Sur, the Chichinautzin Biological Corridor in the 
states of Mexico, Morelos and Distrito Federal, and the Biosphere Reserve El Ocote in the state of 
Chiapas. Additional small-scale projects in temperate and tropical regions of the country are being 
developed by NGOs with the support of private sponsors and the voluntary carbon market [28]. 
Mexico‘s national REDD+ strategy is being developed under the auspices of the World Bank‘s 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), an initiative to assist developing countries in their efforts 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to build their capacities while 
helping them tap into any future system of positive incentives for REDD+ building and promoting 
pilot REDD+ programs. The Readiness Preparation Proposal submitted to the FCPF [54] indicates that 
the government aims to coordinate all these emerging initiatives on REDD+ at different geographical 
scales and bring them together with existing programs for sustainable forest management and 
conservation of forest carbon stocks under a common financial and operational framework, following 
in turn the mandate of the country‘s Special Climate Change Program [86]. This program highlights 
that a significant proportion of emission reductions in the forest sector should result from increasing 
reforestation and improved sustainable forest management, incorporating 750,000 ha of forests into 
national protected areas, establishing REDD pilot programs in 40% of protected areas, increasing 
support for wildlife conservation and management units, and extending PES programs. To date, most 
of these highlighted actions have been financially supported by CONAFOR‘s Pro-Árbol program that 
encompasses former and more recent forestry programs such as PES, and it is designed explicitly to 
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provide subsidies to forest owners for protecting, conserving, restoring and sustainably using forest 
resources across the country [87].  
There may be a need, however, to temper the expectations of these actions in the context of REDD+. 
Increasing the areas under sustainable forest management will require additional funding and further 
government and civil society commitment to support the model of community forestry [88]. Seemingly, 
it will be politically challenging to realign land-use contradictory incentives [89] and the expansion in 
the number of protected areas can be riddled with conflict if communities do not benefit from their 
establishment. Furthermore, research on Mexico‘s PES programs has shown mixed results in relation 
to their impact on deforestation: while early analyses showed inconclusive results [90], recent work 
indicates a positive but not substantive reduction in net deforestation rates [91]. Regarding their impact 
on poverty, PES programs seem to have been successful in targeting poor rural communities but less 
so in involving ―the poorest of the poor‖ [90]. Nonetheless, evidence indicates that they can result in 
positive livelihoods benefits through income diversification and increased community organization 
around forest management issues [41]. 
Land tenure issues are referred in Mexico‘s R-PP in relation to deforestation risk and less so in 
relation to what they imply for REDD+ design and implementation [49]. It is recognized that the risk 
of deforestation and degradation seems to increase in areas with unresolved land tenure conflicts and 
that there are divergences in deforestation and degradation rates across forest tenure regimes. In 
particular, it highlights that net deforestation in private forests is slightly higher than in community 
forests, and argues that the causes of forest degradation under different tenure regimes are still not well 
understood. It also recognizes that communities and ejidos with sustainable forest management plans 
are more successful in halting deforestation than those that do not have these plans. However, it is also 
recognized that establishing forest management and conservation programs based on financial 
compensation can be challenging unless communities and ejidos are effectively organized and 
committed to such programs. In spite of such reflections, the Technical Assessment Panel (TAP) of the 
World Bank‘s FCPF [92] has highlighted that the government has not sufficiently engaged with 
conflicts over land and forest tenure, illegal logging, and other illegal activities. It also highlights the 
need to consider that tenure conflicts pose a major problem for implementing government incentive 
programs, since PES procedural regulations do not permit landowners to receive funds unless they 
have clear and undisputed ownership. Furthermore, the report suggests that the R-PP ―largely fails to 
recognize the special needs, circumstances, and rights of indigenous peoples‘, including their linguistic 
and cultural diversity, and does not have ‗a clear strategy for consulting with indigenous peoples 
organizations‖ [92]. 
Regarding the relationship between land tenure and carbon rights, the 2003 Law for Sustainable 
Forest Development notes that the government should establish ―economic instruments to compensate 
for, support or stimulate landowners and forest owners for the provision of environmental goods and 
services, which should be considered public goods, in order to guarantee the conservation of 
biodiversity and human life‖ (Art. 30.VII; our emphasis in italics; see also Chapter VI). In other 
articles, the Law recognizes the need to develop instruments for the conservation of ecosystem 
services (Art. 142) and highlights that the Mexican Forestry Fund—a financial instrument to promote 
the conservation, sustainable management and restoration of forest resources—can create financial 
bonds associated with forest conservation and ecosystem services provision that can in turn be granted 
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to the landowners (Art. 141). Additionally, it notes that the government can establish quotas or taxes 
over third parties who directly or indirectly benefit from the commercialization of ecosystem services, 
thus also recognizing that ecosystem services can be commercialized by actors other than 
landowners (Art. 138). These premises imply that ecosystem services, including carbon sequestration, 
are public goods provided by landowners while the state assumes responsibility for establishing the 
most appropriate instruments to compensate them for such provision. However, the existence of a few 
private-driven local projects selling carbon credits to national and international investors [6] suggests 
that the state has not been particularly concerned about landowners being attributed de facto ownership 
of carbon rights by third parties. 
In contrast with Mexico‘s early REDD support, Brazil has gradually moved from total opposition to 
grudging acceptance of standing forests being included in the global climate regime. The country, 
however, still remains ambivalent regarding the use of carbon offsets to finance conservation efforts. 
In 1997, the Brazilian federal government opposed the inclusion of instruments to promote tropical 
forest conservation and avoidance of deforestation in the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that this 
would deviate Annex I countries from their responsibility to reduce domestic emissions, and would 
challenge the country‘s national sovereignty. To counter the government‘s opposition to crediting the 
standing forest, Brazilian environmentalists proposed the creation of a mechanism termed 
―compensated reductions‖, which would involve establishing reduction targets and compensation for 
avoided deforestation contingent upon verified reductions in annual clearing rates, as compared to a 
periodically-adjusted historical baseline [93]. Drawing on the former proposal, and shortly before 
COP-12 in 2006, the Brazilian government tabled a mechanism that would reward positive incentives 
for the net reduction of emissions from deforestation in developing countries that voluntarily reduced 
their greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation in relation to a reference emission rate. The 
proposal stressed that efforts should neither be mandatory nor include targets nor timeframes, and it 
remained leery of permitting credits for avoided deforestation activities to be traded in the compliance 
and voluntary carbon markets [94]. 
In 2007, a group of nine NGOs launched the ―Zero Deforestation Pact‖ in the Brazilian Congress, 
proposing a national commitment to reduce deforestation rates in the Amazon from an average  
of 1.4 million hectares in 2005–06 to zero in 2015. Such a commitment would be based on annual 
targets and a series of actions to strengthen forest governance in conjunction with state governments. It 
also proposed a nationwide PES program to incentivize forest conservation among rural communities 
and private owners, and called for the consolidation of existing protected areas, the implementation of 
alternative settlement projects, and increasing support for forest management within indigenous 
territories. It also suggested creating a special Amazon Fund within the National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development (BNDES).  
The Fund was established a year later and has become the leading financial instrument in the 
prevention, monitoring and control of deforestation and promotion of conservation and sustainable use 
of the Amazon biome. It is operating under the overarching National Climate Change Plan [95] and is 
considered the core financial element of Brazil‘s REDD+ strategy, with its contributions being 
channeled towards the following priority areas: management of public forests and protected areas; 
environmental monitoring, control and enforcement; sustainable forest management; (other) economic 
activities based on the sustainable use of forests; ecological-economic zoning, territorial management 
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and land tenure regularization; conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; and, rehabilitation of 
degraded lands. Contributions to the fund are voluntary, but linked, in theory at least, to verifiable 
emission reductions.  
Unlike Mexico and Costa Rica, the Brazilian government has not become part of the World Bank‘s 
FCPF, and it is also not engaged in the UN-REDD program, preferring to define autonomously its 
response to forest protection as part of the climate negotiations. However, the country is no different in 
its rather haphazard development of REDD+ early actions and activities across governance scales. The 
federal government has commissioned a study to investigate the potential of developing a large-scale 
PES program in the Amazon to promote conservation and reduce land-use emissions while state 
governments have prepared action plans that would provide for a ―nested strategy‖ involving 
subnational projects and a gradual transition to a national REDD+ approach. Furthermore, while the 
federal government still resists access to the carbon market for this purpose, and indeed proposes that 
any funding for REDD+ should be channeled through the Amazon Fund, state governors are willing to 
welcome additional offset financing. An example is the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve 
REDD Project in the state of Amazonas, already registered under the Climate Community and 
Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) Standard and selling carbon in voluntary markets. As these policies and 
projects unfold with early initiatives toward REDD+ at a global level, it may be anticipated that a 
means for conciliation between the federal and state governments‘ positions will be found, providing 
for a mix of funding sources, while searching for consistency in national accounting against 
the baseline. 
The nature of carbon rights associated with activities on private, community and indigenous lands is 
uncertain but it seems to be heading towards granting such rights to communities and private 
landowners rather than to the state. Stakeholders at the state level have discussed the prospect of 
incorporating PES payments for carbon conservation as a means of encouraging participation in land 
use regularization. However, such schemes have only reached the preliminary discussion stage, while 
some pilots have been initiated under legislation approved by the state of Amazonas (see discussion 
below on the Bolsa Floresta program) and other states are quickly drawing up their own pilot 
programs. Congress is now considering a specific law regulating REDD+ related environmental 
service commercialization in an effort to grease the wheels for developing a larger market in carbon 
forestry, beyond existing CDM and voluntary pilot projects. 
There is some divisiveness regarding who should be the target of REDD+ payments, and what 
outcomes such decisions might have in terms of efficiency, equity and legitimacy. Environment 
ministry officials have proposed a cap on the amount any individual landholder can receive in 
exchange for forest conservation commitments, rather than letting the market set a price on carbon 
forestry. Where agribusiness interests are by far the dominant voice in local politics, REDD+ benefits 
have sparked considerable interest among those who are unwilling to avoid future deforestation 
without substantial compensation. However, it is difficult to justify magnanimous payment schemes to 
actors who have already, for the most part, overshot the limits set by law. Nevertheless, such an 
approach is being sought, for example, in the state of Mato Grosso, where a pilot REDD+ project is 
being initiated at the northwest frontier. In this region, a complex mosaic of land reform settlements, 
private ranches, timber operations and indigenous territories co-exist and the REDD+ approach can 
help to clarify tenure disputes and substitute more rigorous land use enforcement strategies with the 
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acquiescence of those who, thereby, would be entitled to receive payments for avoided deforestation. 
Although some progress has been made in defining such a strategy for private lands, the access to such 
benefits by agrarian reform beneficiaries remains to be worked out over the coming months. 
In contrast with projects such as the northwest Mato Grosso initiative, community-directed benefit 
sharing strategies such as Bolsa Floresta seek to legitimize informal occupation, by reinforcing and 
stabilizing long-term usufruct rights of traditional groups that have lived for generations in the forest, 
in areas that are not necessarily threatened by excessive deforestation pressures. In these circumstances, 
communities have been granted usufruct rights over so-called Sustainable Development Reserves 
(RDS, for its Brazilian acronym) by the state government, so tenure insecurity is not a critical issue. 
The Sustainable Amazonas Foundation (FAS), also a major grant recipient of the Amazon Fund‘s first 
set of approved projects, manages Bolsa Floresta in conjunction with traditional community 
development projects in state-owned RDS in Amazonas state, with additional support from private 
donors (Brazil‘s largest private bank, Bradesco, and the Mariott hotel chain are major contributors). 
FAS has implemented three main categories of payments and benefit sharing strategies, including  
(1) financial compensations to individual households to defray part of the opportunity costs involved in 
implementing REDD+; (2) incentives/rewards to communities to motivate conservation actions; and, 
(3) interventions necessary for REDD+ to become effective, such as legal and technical support and 
modest investments in community enterprises based on non-timber forest products and ecotourism, for 
example [96]. We acknowledge that such distribution of REDD+ incentives to low income forest 
dwelling groups is more equitable than paying large landowners to avoid deforestation, but probably 
does not make a significant dent in meeting REDD+ targets. This may also occur in Mexico if the 
government incentivized communities involved in sustainable forest management. 
Costa Rica, jointly with Papua New Guinea (PNG), was the first country to propose a mechanism at 
UNFCCC negotiations for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries in 2005. Two years later, at COP-13, other countries, such as India, Indonesia and Bhutan, 
joined forces to support the inclusion of conservation activities under a REDD framework and to 
ensure that countries with a relatively stable forest cover over the past few decades could also benefit, 
thus further increasing forest cover [5]. As for Mexico, the country joined the World Bank‘s FCPF to 
design a common financing and implementation framework for REDD+ policies and measures. 
As noted in Section 3.3, Costa Rica‘s PES program was the world‘s first initiative of this kind, 
established under the precepts of the country‘s 1996 Forest Law. The law defined fiscal instruments 
that would serve the creation of an economic and institutional framework through which forest owners 
could be compensated for providing environmental services and public goods, including the National 
Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO). FONAFIFO administers and allocates funds from a share of 
fuel and water related taxes, international funds and other donations to forest owners providing 
ecosystem services. It is now being reorganized for the purpose of REDD+ so that its board of 
directors also includes representatives from indigenous development associations and civil society 
groups. It will also encompass a coordination unit that will include technical and administrative staff 
and an external unit that will be responsible for monitoring, reporting and verifying the country‘s 
reduced emissions and increased carbon stocks. In the short term, REDD+ preparedness funding will 
be used to discourage illegal logging, promote the consumption of sustainable wood from natural, 
secondary, and planted forests, and maximise voluntary participation in the PES program [83]. 
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Additionally, Costa Rica aims to strengthen the role of the National System of Conservation Areas 
(SINAC, for its acronym in Spanish) in controlling illegal logging by developing a satellite digital 
system backed up by field-based verification activities. 
If the country‘s REDD+ strategy is likely to be structured around PES, then it results worth 
highlighting (as for Mexico) that the evidence on the program‘s effects on reduced deforestation is far 
from conclusive. Some studies suggest that deforestation rates have been effectively attenuated 
through direct payments in some regions [97,98] while others suggest that the fact that payments have 
been mostly targeted to areas with very low deforestation risk has implied a very limited impact on net 
deforestation [99]. All seems to indicate that PES effects on deforestation are highly dependent on the 
analytical method and the location of the study area, which determines the type of owner (i.e., an 
individual or an ADII) and any potential effects of other complementary forest programs. In any case, 
the fact that Costa Rica‘s forests are overall a net carbon sink also implies that payments efficiency 
should not be considered such an important issue. FONAFIFO has been rather more concerned with 
the ―social recognition‖ of environmental services and with the social ―additionality‖ of the  
program [100]. In this regard, the government claims to have mostly benefited small and medium 
landowners in impoverished rural areas [83] even if this contradicts evidence from academic studies 
that have shown a bias towards supporting large forest owners [101,102]. Costa Rica‘s R-PP 
recognizes, however, that, until 2008, those lacking formal titles and living within private landholdings, 
protected areas or indigenous reserves were unable to benefit from PES activities. Now they can access 
a legal land title only if they prove that they have held informal tenure from 1998 to 2008, 
accompanied by a legal declaration by neighboring owners accepting the creation of a new  
landholding [83]. This legislative amendment reflects the government‘s willingness to make land 
titling a priority, insofar as the latter is the only means to secure access to sustainable forest 
management and PES programs or to engage in carbon rights transactions with third parties. 
In line with Mexico, Costa Rica recognizes the social value of ecosystem services in the 1996 
Forest Law (Article 3) and the need to compensate forest owners for their provision (Article 22). 
However, the country‘s R-PP defines carbon rights as an ―asset‖ or ―good‖ belonging to the owner of 
the land where the benefit is achieved, based on existing jurisprudence [Resolution 546-90]; see  
also [103,104]. The constitutional court has ruled that the asset into which forests or plantations may 
turn as a result of the ecosystem services they provide is an actual right, derived from the ownership of 
the forest and, therefore attributable to its owner. Any party owning carbon is thus entitled to 
participate in national and international transactions related to emission reductions and while private 
contract law will regulate transactions between private actors, public law will be applicable if the state 
is one of the parties. Taking into account these legal precepts, PES beneficiaries are de facto 
transferring their carbon rights to FONAFIFO and therefore should refrain from selling carbon 
reductions to third parties in order to avoid double counting. In contrast, those who do not participate 
in the PES program are entitled to sell their carbon rights to third parties but should inform the 
government for accounting and transparency purposes. The Costa Rican government aims to create a 
fraud control unit and a registry of environmental services rights to control the commercialization and 
exchange of carbon rights as well as their proper accounting [83]. 
The World Bank‘s TAP for Costa Rica has highlighted that the government needs to explain further 
how it will deal with illegal squatting in public and private forests, besides trying to enforce the rules, 
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and how it will deal with a possible trend towards more profitable economic activities induced by 
market changes, real estate expansion or population growth [105]. It is also noted that the government 
remains unclear about how landowners‘ carbon liabilities will be dealt with in the context of the PES 
program and subnational carbon projects, an aspect also underdeveloped in the Mexican R-PP. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Forest Tenure, Deforestation and Enforcement in REDD+ 
Land and forest tenure is a central issue of concern for future REDD+ policies and measures at 
country level. This is because tenure regimes define rights over forest resources and, as such, they 
determine who should be held responsible for making decisions on forest management and land use 
and who should be held responsible for losses or gains in forest carbon. Forest tenure regimes also 
determine who can claim ownership and access to ecosystem services and their benefit streams, and 
these regimes will thus critically mediate the ability of REDD+ policies and measures to achieve their 
outcomes [10,106]. In many cases, insecure forest tenure contributes to deforestation and forest 
degradation processes, although secure rights do not necessarily contribute to forest conservation [36]. 
Secure tenure helps to foster investments in forest conservation and sustainable forest management but 
also in agricultural activities. Furthermore, tenure will determine REDD+ policies and measures in 
terms of effectiveness, efficiency, equity and legitimacy [107]: it will determine conservation outputs, 
their cost-effectiveness, forest users‘ access to benefits and their degree of legitimacy.  
These arguments have been effectively picked up by the evolving REDD+ strategies of our three 
selected countries, as well as by other countries involved in the World Bank and UN-REDD  
programs [108,109]. Countries identify the wide array of factors driving deforestation and 
degradation—predominantly unclear land tenure and weak capacity for forest management and law 
enforcement—but fail to analyze how REDD+ strategies could respond to these challenges, and 
involve key stakeholders and forest users in such analysis [109]. Mexico and Costa Rica are no 
exception and their R-PPs do not include sufficient detail on how governments will address persisting 
tenure insecurities, and both present and future conflicts in forested areas. Mexico does not clarify 
what will be done to mitigate conflicts in about two million ha of the country‘s forests—conflicts that 
have not been resolved through PROCEDE—and whether REDD+ policies and actions will simply 
avoid targeting areas in which tenure disputes persist [54]. It does not provide any guidance either on 
whether communities and ejidos should consider avecindados in benefit sharing from REDD+, which 
in turn allows us to infer that communities will be free to decide on this matter. Costa Rica, in turn, 
mentions that titling efforts will be pursued, particularly in state-owned forest reserves in order to grant 
certain ―bundles of rights‖—without specifying which—to squatters and engage them in sustainable 
forest management and conservation efforts [83].  
In Brazil, since deforestation is concentrated along the so-called ―Deforestation Arc‖, where tenure 
insecurity and illegal grabbing prevail, land tenure regularization is being promoted as a prerequisite to 
win contracts for environmental services, being these global or local in scope. The recent law that 
provides for title regularization of recent and historical occupations in the Amazon could in fact 
promote additional deforestation. This could be further aggravated by the revision of the Forest Code 
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that would allow private landowners to clear land in excess of the levels currently permitted. Although 
a perfunctory environmental license is now required for additional deforestation in the Amazon biome, 
for REDD+ to be effective within the context of land tenure regularization, it would be necessary to 
establish additional environmental restrictions to ensure forest permanence.  
In this regard, the enforcement of existing forest rights and legal provisions, through both state and 
customary institutions, appear as central elements of REDD+ strategies in our selected countries and 
other developing countries [108,109]. It is generally accepted that illegal logging and squatting in 
forest areas has occurred because neither local landholders nor the government have been able to 
exclude encroachers or to prosecute them. In many cases, due to weak enforcement, landholders have 
obtained fake titles for illegally appropriated lands, often linked to corruption involving private land 
registration offices. In this context, REDD+ incentives are seen as an opportunity to cover some, if not 
all, of the incremental costs involved in strengthening enforcement, addressing corruption and 
monitoring illegal logging and trade. Nonetheless, as is the case for insecure tenure and land-use 
conflicts, detailed plans on how to address current enforcement problems have not been outlined by 
most countries involved in REDD+ [109]. This is probably explained by the fact that such plans should 
count with the committed endorsement of local authorities, forestry officers and national and local 
elites and may in turn involve challenging the status quo [4,110]. Furthermore, a critical but as yet not 
debated question is how enhanced enforcement in particular contexts can lead to detrimental impacts 
on forest dwellers holding (or not) formal land titles and on those who, within a collective forest 
regime, hold none or limited withdrawal rights. 
We are inclined to suggest that putting the burden for resolving historical land use and property 
rights conflicts on REDD+ is a fallacy that must be put to rest. We agree with those who claim that 
REDD+ may offer an opportunity to promote reduced deforestation and degradation within those 
contexts in which property rights issues have been sorted out. We also think that it can become an 
important source of additional resources to assist in bridging improved land-use management and 
property rights protection for those countries and landowners who are performing well on social and 
environmental grounds [10,111]. But future REDD+ incentives may not cover the incremental costs 
associated with property rights regularization and the enforcement of resource management legal 
provisions. In addition, as others have highlighted, carbon payments as part of REDD+ may not always 
cover the full opportunity costs of other land-use activities in areas where these result highly profitable 
on-site and along the commodity chain [28,112]. 
5.2. Multiple Forest Tenure Regimes, Multiple REDD+ Approaches 
In Section 3 we showed that each country is characterized by multiple forest tenure systems, and 
thus varied shares of public, collective or private forests. This should be the starting point for 
designing policies and measures that can effectively translate into increased carbon stocks and 
improved economic benefits for all the rights holders involved, with special attention on the poorest 
and less powerful. Tables 3, 4 and 5 describe the ―bundles of rights‖ under each of the existing tenure 
regimes in our selected countries and highlight their implications for REDD+ design and implementation.
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Table 3. Forest tenure systems in Mexico—―Bundles of rights‖ and implications for REDD+ design and implementation. 
 Private forests Social property forests State-owned forests 
 
Individual or family landowner; 
private cooperative/organization, 
NGOs 
Agrarian communities Ejidos 
Natural protected areas, 
biological reserves, etc 
Public forests under 
short/long-term 
concessions for forest 
management 
Rights of 
access 
Privately mediated. Collective, but mediated by the community assembly 
Access regulated in buffer 
zones and often prohibited 
in core protection areas, 
except in occasional 
circumstances and for 
particular recreational uses 
Access defined by the 
terms of the agreement 
with the concessionaire 
Rights of 
withdrawal 
Withdrawal of timber, NTFPs 
requires authorization by the 
state and the development of a 
forest management plan 
No restrictions over Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) and 
firewood, but restrictions over timber extraction (internal quotas). 
Resource use is often gender differentiated, particularly in indigenous 
groups, and avecindados can very rarely benefit from forest resources. 
Withdrawal for marketing purposes requires authorization by the state 
and the development of a forest management plan (that needs to be 
approved by the state) 
Authorized for some NTFPs 
and fuelwood in buffer 
zones and forbidden for 
timber. Any kind of 
withdrawal forbidden in 
core protection areas 
Authorized only for the 
concessionaire, following 
the terms of agreement 
regarding NTFPs and 
timber 
Rights of 
management 
Privately mediated, as defined in 
the previously authorized Forest 
Management Plan 
A forest management plan needs to be designed by the community 
assembly following forest policy regulations (e.g., extraction is 
prohibited in forest areas with more than a certain slope and in river 
margins, and also in general in forests with less than a minimum timber 
density). Thus the government holds the vast majority of forest 
management rights 
Established by state 
regulations 
Established by the state, 
under the terms of the 
forest management plan 
agreed with the 
concessionaire 
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Table 3. Cont. 
 Private forests Social property forests State-owned forests 
Rights of 
exclusion 
Private owners have the right to 
exclude outsiders from their 
property 
Members have the right to exclude outsiders from 
accessing/withdrawing resources in farming lands or the 
commons 
Held by public agencies in 
charge of managing the site 
Held by public agencies in 
charge of the site, as well 
as by the concessionaire 
Rights of 
alienation 
Private owners can sell or lease 
their rights to other parties 
Land transactions among 
community members are 
allowed but sales to third 
parties are forbidden 
Land transactions among 
community members are 
allowed but sales to third 
parties should be approved 
by the assembly 
Held by the state; lands in 
buffer zones cannot be 
parceled or transferred 
Held by the state; the 
concessionaires cannot sale 
or further lease the land 
under their management 
Authority (to 
sanction rights 
and/or 
representing 
the collective) 
State institutions, including the 
Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) 
in case of violation of forest 
management rights and the 
Agrarian Reform Ministry if 
property rights result threatened by 
third parties 
Traditional community 
assembly and periodically 
elected authority council; the 
state can mediate in favor of the 
community in cases of illegal 
use and land encroachment by 
migrants or neighboring 
communities 
The assembly and the 
periodically elected authority 
council; the state can mediate 
in favor of the community in 
cases of illegal use and land 
encroachment by migrants or 
neighboring communities 
The Ministry of Environment 
and Natural Resources 
(SEMARNAT), in particularly 
through the Environmental 
Protection Agency 
(PROFEPA) and the National 
Commission of Protected 
Areas (CONANP) 
The Ministry of 
Environment and Natural 
Resources (SEMARNAT), 
in particular through the 
National Forestry 
Commission (CONAFOR) 
Implications 
for REDD+ 
design & 
implementation 
Need to clarify carbon ownership 
and liabilities if landowners have 
leased their land to third parties. 
Need to increase technical and 
legal support for landowners so 
that they can more effectively deal 
with the external violation of their 
forest management plans, for 
example by illegal loggers or land 
squatters 
Carbon rights belong to members but enforcement of long-term 
commitment can be difficult. 
Attribution of individual liabilities in a community context is 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Distribution of incentives among members can be a conflicting 
process, particularly if forests are managed by multiple actors 
(e.g., CFEs, external concessionaires) and for multiple purposes 
Increase patrolling by area 
rangers necessary but 
potentially contested: 
establishment of usufruct 
resource-conservation 
arrangements with third parties 
and promote livelihood 
diversification may be 
required. 
Carbon rights and liabilities 
fall exclusively on the state 
There is a need to clarify 
who is entitled to carbon 
revenues and who is 
responsible for losses. 
It should also be clarified if 
concessionaires are entitled 
to sell carbon benefits to 
third parties and, if so, 
under which conditions 
(including taxation if 
applicable) 
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Table 4. Forest tenure systems in Brazil—―Bundles of rights‖ and implications for REDD+ design and implementation. 
 Private forests Social property State-owned forests 
 
Individual or family 
landowner; private 
cooperative/ 
organization, NGOs 
Traditional 
community (shared 
property systems) 
National parks, 
protected areas, etc. 
Indigenous reserves 
Extractive 
reserves 
Sustainable 
development 
reserves 
Agro-
extractive and 
forestry 
settlements 
Private concessions 
Rights of 
access 
Privately mediated, 
regulated by the state 
for Legal Reserves 
and APPs 
Attributed by groups 
of proprietors in 
accord with 
customary practices 
Mediated by the 
federal, state or 
local government 
Delimited by the state 
according to historical 
occupation/claims 
Collective / 
mediated 
by RESEX 
council 
Mediated by 
state or 
federal 
government 
Mediated by 
INCRA or 
state agrarian 
reform agency 
Mediated by federal, 
state or local 
government 
Rights of 
withdrawal 
Unrestricted 
extraction for direct 
local use except 
from APPs 
Unrestricted 
extraction for direct 
local use 
No extraction 
permitted of any 
kind 
No restrictions on extraction of NTFPs or timber for domestic or 
collective local use (except Permanent Protection Areas-APPs) 
No restrictions for 
NFTPs or timber 
products for direct 
local use by 
concessionaire or 
laborers 
Rights of 
management 
Rights to withdraw 
timber, NTFP 
subject to a state-
approved 
management plan 
Rights to withdraw 
timber, NTFP subject 
to collective 
agreements 
No extraction 
permitted of any 
kind; research, 
education and 
tourism subject to 
management plan 
Commercial logging 
may be allowed based 
on approved 
management plans (no 
approved cases to 
date) 
Commercial logging allowed if it 
complements other activities based on 
approved management plans 
Commercial logging 
allowed based on 
approved management 
plans and subject to 
payment of fees to the 
state 
Rights of 
exclusion 
 
Private landowners 
exclude other users 
subject to ―social 
function‖ of land 
(may offer limited 
access by others) 
Traditional 
communities have no 
legal right to exclude 
contested users but 
seek to regularize use 
State managers have 
the right to demand 
removal of 
conflicting users 
Indigenous groups 
have the right to 
exclude or demand 
removal of all non-
tribal users 
Members have the right and responsibility to 
exclude outsiders 
Concessionaires have 
the right to exclude 
outsiders 
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Table 4. Cont. 
 
Private 
forests 
Social 
property 
State-owned forests 
Rights of 
alienation 
 
Private owners 
can sell or lease 
their rights to 
other parties 
Community 
members cannot 
sell common 
property, but their 
rights may be 
usurped since they 
lack titles 
No land sale is 
permitted; 
concessions to 
operate non-
extractive 
activities may be 
permitted 
Land 
transactions are 
not allowed; 
rights are 
hereditary to 
tribal members 
collectively 
Land transactions 
are not allowed; 
rights are inherited 
Land 
transactions are 
not allowed; 
rights are 
inherited 
Until titling and 
emancipation of 
settlement, no land 
transactions may 
take place except 
to other approved 
settlers  
Concessionaires may 
withdraw or be 
removed if they do 
not follow the 
management plan or 
pay fees 
Authority 
(to sanction 
rights 
and/or 
representing 
the 
collective) 
The state 
sanctions private 
occupation and 
use; approves 
management 
plans over Legal 
Reserves 
Proprietors 
attempt to 
sanction rights, 
but may be 
contested 
The designated 
local, state or 
federal agency 
approves the 
management plan; 
in absence of plan 
no use is 
permitted 
The federal 
government 
agency FUNAI 
assists but does 
not control tribal 
land 
management and 
protection 
against incursion 
The state approves 
management plans. 
The RESEX council 
oversees resource 
use/management 
The state 
approves 
management 
plans; local 
community 
associations 
oversee resource 
management and 
protection 
The state imposes 
individual and 
collective land use 
plans and oversees 
management plans 
for forest resource 
use in cases they 
exist 
The state sanctions 
and authorizes 
concessionaire‘s use 
rights, subject to 
periodic evaluation 
and third-party 
certification 
Implications 
for REDD+ 
and carbon 
rights 
REDD+ benefits 
should only be 
provided when 
landowner 
formally protects 
area in excess of 
Forest Code 
requirement 
Common property 
and management 
need 
strengthening; 
could be favorable 
to REDD+  
Unclear whether 
protected non-use 
areas should be 
considered 
additional for 
REDD+; de facto 
versus de jure 
protection may 
imply value added 
by REDD+ 
Unclear to whom 
carbon rights 
belong, but 
tendency to 
remain with 
tribal authority; 
REDD+ can be 
crucial to protect 
and sustain 
indigenous areas 
Collective favorable 
to REDD+;  
Distribution of 
REDD+ incentives 
through RESEX 
board possible, but 
public property may 
imply governmental 
control 
Collective 
favorable to 
REDD+; require 
structuring of 
local 
administrative 
entity to avert 
transactions 
costs to members 
PES to individual 
settlers can make 
agroextractive 
settlement more 
viable and value 
remaining forests; 
important 
opportunity for 
REDD+  
Public forests law 
specifically excludes 
commercialization 
of carbon services; 
long-term 
permanence and 
reduced degradation 
important to REDD+ 
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Table 5. Forest tenure systems in Costa Rica—―Bundles of rights‖ and implications for REDD+ design and implementation. 
 Private forests State-owned forests 
 
Individual or family landowner; 
private cooperative/ organization, 
NGOs 
Indigenous reserves 
Natural protected areas, biological 
reserves, etc 
Protected wilderness areas (PWA) 
Rights of 
access 
Privately mediated 
Collective, but mediated by the 
community general assembly of the 
ADIIs 
Access regulated and often prohibited in 
the whole protection areas, except in 
particular public use zones where 
regulated activities are allowed 
according to management plan 
Access regulated and often prohibited in 
state land and privately mediated in private 
land 
Rights of 
withdrawal 
 
Withdrawal of timber and NTFP 
requires specific authorization by 
SINAC. In forest plantations, timber 
can be harvested without permission -
but a transportation permit is required 
Withdrawal rules defined by the 
ADIIs, but resources can only be 
used for subsistence purposes 
Resource withdrawal is forbidden Resource withdrawal is forbidden 
Rights of 
management 
 
In natural forests management rules 
are set in the correspondent SFM and 
Forest Conservation plans. 
In forest plantations, the owner has the 
right to manage forest resources freely. 
Forests under a PES contract face 
some management restrictions 
No forest management rights for 
commercial use. 
Land-use change is forbidden 
Established by state regulation. Allowed 
management activities include fire 
breaks, fencing, vigilance, and visitation 
management, maintenance of trails, 
signs, and infrastructure. These should 
be directed to biodiversity conservation 
and research and biodiversity  
Management follows state regulations 
Rights of 
exclusion 
 
Private owners have the right to 
exclude outsiders from their property 
Members have the right to exclude 
outsiders from 
accessing/withdrawing resources 
Held by the state through SINAC, 
which is responsible of their protection 
In private land: private owners have the right 
to exclude outsiders from their property. 
In public land: held by SINAC, in charge of 
managing protected areas 
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Table 5. Cont. 
 Private forests State-owned forests 
Rights of 
alienation 
 
Private owners can sell or lease their 
land, forest and carbon rights to other 
parties  
Land transactions among 
community members are allowed 
but sales to third parties are 
forbidden. There are severe 
problems of squatting and 
appropriation of forest resources in 
indigenous territories 
Held by the state 
 The state cannot sell land. Private owners 
can sell or lease their land, forest and carbon 
rights to other parties. In the case of carbon, 
the owner may assign his/her carbon rights 
to a third party subject to a compensation 
mechanism 
Authority (to 
sanction rights 
and/or 
representing 
the collective) 
State institutions (SINAC, Ministry of 
Environment), forest regents, police, 
the College of Agricultural Engineers 
(CIAGRO), and the judiciary in case 
of violation of forest management 
rights or the PES contract 
Customary law and community 
assembly 
The Ministry of Environment and 
SINAC in particular through the 
National Park Service and the 
Committees for the Surveillance of 
Natural Resources (COVIRENAS).  
The judiciary is in charge to process 
violations of forest rights 
State institutions (SINAC, Ministry of 
Environment) and the judiciary in case of 
violation of forest management rights or the 
PES contract 
Implications 
for REDD+ 
design & 
implementation 
The owner can assign his/her carbon 
rights to a third party subject to a 
compensation mechanism. Those 
carbon rights bought by FONAFIFO 
through PES contracts belong to the 
state 
In indigenous territories, 
environmental services, and carbon 
belong to the indigenous 
community, and idem to previous 
column. 
Internal distribution of REDD+ 
incentives through ADIIs 
In public lands, carbon rights belong to 
the state 
In public lands carbon rights belong to the 
state, and in private land idem to second 
column 
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While in Mexico collective ownership underpins the management and conservation of most of the 
country‘s forests (above 70%), only about 35% of the Brazilian Amazon forests are managed by rural 
communities and indigenous groups under different property regimes and regulations. These 
percentages are likely to change as long as the partial devolution of public lands to rural communities 
continues, particularly in extractive reserves, RDS and agroforestry settlements in both federal and 
state-owned lands [32]. In Costa Rica, public and private ownership are approximately equally shared, 
with forest collective management undertaken in at least 10% of the country‘s forests, while there has 
been a trend in recent years towards a re-appropriation of private forests by the state.  
The fact that forests are to a considerable extent controlled by rural communities, particularly in 
Mexico and to a lesser degree in Brazil and Costa Rica, can be regarded as an opportunity to maximize 
the environmental and social outcomes of REDD+. Although depending on institutional conditions and 
self-governance capacity, rural communities have proved to be effective forest stewards, engaging in 
community forest management and payment for environmental services related-projects, among  
others [41,74,113]. If communities get well organized, and internal conflicts over land and resources 
are managed, they often build legitimate benefit sharing arrangements for timber and other forest 
products that can be used by REDD+ policies and measures to channel financial incentives to the local 
level [114,115]. One could oppositely argue that common property forest regimes can also result in 
degradation and land-use change, which can be particularly severe if they result in substantial profits 
for their members and/or their elites [64]. 
The evidence presented in Tables 3–5 distinguishes multiple ―bundles of rights‖ in collectively 
managed forest regimes. The ―bundles‖ differ depending on whether communities hold all but 
alienation rights over forest resources (e.g., indigenous communities and ejidos in Mexico, and 
smallholder settlements in Brazil) or they hold more or less regulated access, withdrawal and 
management rights over forest resources (e.g., indigenous land and extractive reserves in Brazil, and 
indigenous reserves in Costa Rica). A shared characteristic of these regimes, however, is that they are 
governed by a combination of state-based and customary authority systems. These are critical for 
developing forest management and conservation activities and ensuring the local legitimacy of any 
REDD+ related adopted option, contributing in turn to enforce existing and new regulations regarding 
land and forest use. The way that tenure regimes interact with local systems of authority has important 
implications for land-use related decisions and local benefit sharing. 
We suggest that four important issues should be considered when REDD+ actions are developed 
through collective forest tenure regimes. The first has to do with procedural legitimacy; that is, 
ensuring that indigenous and rural communities—or at least their representatives—are involved from 
the start in designing REDD+ strategies across governance scales, even if such involvement increases 
the cost of the consultation process and the time employed to draft such strategies. Many scholars have 
already observed that the early involvement of community groups in REDD+ design, both at country 
and international levels, is critical from both a democratic and legal perspective, as well as for ensuring 
the long-term success of REDD+ policies and measures [106,116]. Unfortunately, evidence from 
Mexico and Costa Rica suggests that there are not yet clear government procedures for how indigenous 
peoples and community groups will shape REDD+ policies and measures or how they will be involved, 
for example, in monitoring early actions. This is again a common vacuum in other countries involved 
in the World Bank FCPF initiative [108,109]. 
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A second important issue to take into account when REDD+ options are implemented by rural 
communities, and also relevant for private forests, concerns the provision of clear, but substantive 
information on why and where REDD+ activities should be developed, and who is entitled to forest 
carbon and its correspondent benefit streams. Governments should clearly identify who owns carbon in 
community-managed forests—state-owned or not—how carbon rights should be transferred or 
managed for commercialization and what are the implications of the chosen strategies for benefit 
sharing by all parties (i.e., government, forest rights holders and other interested actors,  
including community forestry enterprises, timber concessionaires and NGOs). Furthermore, for 
community-managed forests, REDD+ may compete with other uses and thus its implementation may 
take away rights that communities had historically considered their own (e.g., rights to use certain 
products in the forest or to cut down trees), which becomes a particular concern in cases where 
REDD+ is implemented in a way that requires delimiting ―hands-off‖ zones. It may also drive 
communities with active timber harvesting into conservation schemes that may pay more initially but 
may increase communities‘ dependency on government payments, and on the willingness and ability 
of governments to continue these payments. 
The third issue concerns the future distribution of REDD+ incentives within forest communities. 
This tends to be overlooked in REDD+ writings, insofar as communities are perceived to have their 
own legitimate systems of benefit sharing. However, evidence from carbon forestry projects operating 
on common property has shown that project developers ignore community politics and do not pay 
attention to the exclusion of particular social groups from carbon payments, such as women, landless 
people, and other vulnerable groups of the rural poor [6,10]. This inevitably poses difficult questions: 
should governments and project developers oversee the distribution of REDD+ benefits within rural 
communities and indigenous groups? And, if they should, what are the political costs and the 
organizational challenges of doing so? Communities partnering with timber concessionaires will 
encounter an additional layer of complexity since REDD+ activities will have to be aligned with the 
concessionaire‘s interest and carbon revenue sharing may become a source of conflict. 
The fourth and last issue to account for is the likely impact of proposed REDD+ instruments not 
only on benefit sharing, but also on local culture and future attitudes towards conservation, and the 
subsequent need to rethink and adapt REDD+ options to local contexts. However, there seems to be a 
clear trend in selected countries, as well as across Latin America, to use economic instruments like 
PES programs as pillars of national REDD+ strategies. These programs are still relatively young 
experiments and, as we already discussed, they are characterized by uncertain and mixed outcomes on 
reduced deforestation, conservation and livelihood impacts, including poverty alleviation. Therefore it 
would be risky to make a considerable part of REDD+ success conditional on PES performance. Some 
have argued that these programs may ―crowd-out‖ conservation attitudes in the medium term, inducing 
forest users to threaten deforestation unless they are continuously rewarded [117-119]. 
The opportunities and challenges involved in bringing forest communities to participate actively in 
REDD+ should not, however, make us forget about the likely benefits and risks involved in engaging 
private forest owners, or long-term usufruct concessionaires, in policies and measures for sustainable 
forest management and conservation. Private forest owners are likely to be interested in REDD+ if the 
designed policies and measures are sufficiently attractive in both procedural and economic terms, 
insofar as trade-offs are very likely between carbon emissions due to logging, which can be low under 
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good forest management, and the economic returns on that activity [120]. For example, Brazilian 
private concessionaires operating in public forests have been allowed to commercialize carbon credits 
from reforestation but not so from avoided deforestation. Generally speaking, in private forests, benefit 
sharing may not be as complex as in collective forest tenure regimes, but the same concerns 
highlighted above about transparency of information and clarification of carbon ownership issues also 
apply. Furthermore, as for those communities who engage in commercial logging through community 
enterprises, the government will need to account for carbon balances in forest management and design 
monitoring and verification systems that link with national carbon accounting systems. 
In the case of state-owned and managed forests, it has been argued that REDD+ may be used by 
governments to expand protected areas and improve their management, following those who advocate 
for a renewed exclusionary conservation agenda [121]. REDD+ incentives, however, may not be 
sufficient to address current management problems and enforcement levels in many protected areas, 
particularly because, as for community-managed forests, land-use change in this case also reflects 
complex and overlapping social and political processes [122]. This requires effective coordination and 
willingness to cooperate across government agencies and from those involved in land-use change, a 
difficult endeavor that will require both additional resources and political willingness [119]. 
Furthermore, as occurring in Brazil, there may be social contestation over the use of protected areas 
designated for integral non-use to become objects for REDD+ carbon accounting, even if significant 
logging proceeds in these areas. Nonetheless, where specific REDD+ actions result in the creation of 
new protected areas, carbon revenues will probably be critical in guaranteeing their viability and 
addressing conflicting uses of forest resources. 
5.3. Framing Carbon Rights across Forest Tenure Regimes 
The last critical question concerns the treatment of carbon rights and associated liabilities. Costa 
Rican jurisprudence recognizes that carbon rights belong to forest owners, and such a perspective  
re-emphasizes the critical role that forest tenure rights play in REDD+, insofar as lacking title would 
impede a resource user becoming entitled to carbon rights and accessing their potential benefits. On 
the other hand, it establishes a clear legal framework on which resource users can rely to claim and 
benefit from carbon rights. Such framework also defines how forest owners can transfer their carbon 
rights to third parties, and explicitly acknowledges that such rights become de facto owned by the state 
if forest owners engage in public PES programs. 
Legal clarity is still absent in Mexico and Brazil. While Mexican law defines carbon sequestration 
as a public good and acknowledges the importance of compensating landowners for its provision, the 
government has not been concerned by the fact that several private projects have already sold carbon 
credits to international and national buyers. Brazil, in turn, is in the process of drafting national 
legislation for REDD+ quotas on private lands and PES development on lands owned by traditional 
communities. However, it is unclear whether the latter would be able to access payments when their 
usufruct rights are exercised on public lands. As noted in Section 4 above, Brazil‘s Law on the 
Management of Public Forests already contains an explicit reference to the state‘s legitimate 
entitlement to forest carbon from concessionaires and it is thus likely that the state will also claim the 
carbon rights from government-administered areas, as in Mexico and Costa Rica. 
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The existing jurisprudence and the preliminary steps being taken to define how carbon rights will be 
played out under each type of forest regime are necessary and should be welcomed. These steps are 
also being taken in other developing countries, where there also seems to be a clear trend towards 
linking carbon rights directly with those who are actually responsible for forest management, as 
defined in formal property arrangements and regulations. Governments seem to be willing to grant 
carbon rights to actual forest users while retaining carbon rights from publicly managed forests and, in 
some cases, as in Brazil, also from forest management activities in private concessions. The latter 
approach may be aimed at preventing private actors like timber companies profiting from  
carbon trading. 
It is our view, however, that governments have still not reflected clearly on the liabilities associated 
with holding and exercising carbon rights. This is clearly an underdeveloped aspect in evolving 
REDD+ national strategies under the World Bank and UN-REDD programs. In our selected cases, 
neither Mexico nor Costa Rica explain in their R-PPs the penalties associated with carbon rights if 
their holders fail to meet their long-term commitments to reducing deforestation and enhancing forest 
carbon stocks. Insights, for example, on how non-compliance penalties in PES programs have actually 
been enforced (and if not, why) have not been provided. Similarly, there is no information on how 
local communities who have sold their carbon rights should respond to any carbon losses in the future. 
For example, should a community that deliberately engages in land-use change respond to carbon 
removals in the same way as another one where such removals result from illegal logging by third 
parties or a natural hazard? Seemingly, it is unclear how communities engaging with third parties in 
carbon trading can enforce their rights if these parties fail to meet contract requirements. 
These are, of course, only some of the questions that could be posed when we think about the 
relationship between carbon rights and liabilities. Therefore, coming up with understandable 
regulations for forest users, government officers and other actors involved in REDD+ is particularly 
urgent given the increasing number of REDD+ sub-national activities being developed by governments 
and non-state actors. In this regard, as Costa Rica‘s example suggests, new institutions to deal with 
carbon accounting and carbon rights transfers, as well as monitoring, enforcement and verification of 
carbon credit trading, are likely to be created. These should operate in a transparent manner and be 
endorsed by any formal and customary authorities involved in the management, control and 
sanctioning of forest resources from local to national levels. 
6. Conclusions 
REDD+ is becoming a reference framework in developing countries to strengthen and develop new 
policies and measures for halting land-use change and increasing sustainable forest management and 
conservation initiatives. This paper has reflected on the role of forest tenure in the context of REDD+, 
and particularly on the interactions between forest rights, REDD+ policies and measures, and carbon 
rights and liabilities. Informed by evidence from Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica, it has been shown that 
forest tenure regimes are a product of historical processes, which encompass multiple ―bundles of 
rights‖ over different forest resources and that in turn determine who has access to and control over 
these resources. The paper has shown the different configuration of forest tenure regimes in Mexico, 
Brazil and Costa Rica and discussed how REDD+ national strategies have considered issues related to 
Forests 2011, 2              
 
 
334 
deforestation and degradation, enforcement and carbon rights. The paper has also discussed how the 
selected countries‘ forest tenure regimes are likely to shape the development of REDD+ policies and 
measures, including benefit sharing, the allocation of carbon rights and the distribution of liabilities. 
For example, it has been shown that the three selected countries‘ approach to REDD+ international 
negotiations has differed substantially, with Mexico and Costa Rica being extremely supportive since 
its early days and Brazil opposing any mechanism that could favor forest carbon trading. At present, 
however, all three countries are now involved in a somewhat haphazard progress towards the design of 
REDD+ national and sub-national strategies and institutions. Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica have not 
yet drawn detailed plans on how they will address tenure insecurity and conflict issues, or how they 
will halt illegal resource use in different contexts, taking into account that REDD+ ex-post incentives 
may not cover the full costs of such reforms. Furthermore, Mexico and Brazil still need to clarify who 
is entitled to carbon rights under each tenure regime and what will be the role of the state in REDD+ 
related carbon trading. 
An important contribution of this paper has been to highlight four important questions that need to 
be taken into account when REDD+ activities are developed in common property regimes. First, 
REDD+ host country governments need to create institutions that allow for the participation of 
community representatives and indigenous peoples in policies and measures‘ design and 
implementation. Second, providing key information on REDD+ to rural communities, such as ―what is 
it‖ and ―who should get what‖, can make a substantial different on local participation and legitimacy, 
as well as on benefit sharing. In this regard, it has been noted that the development of REDD+ 
activities may not be politically neutral and therefore conflicts and inequities may ensue. Finally, the 
paper has also warned against the risk of relying on tools like PES to increase collective conservation 
outputs, insofar as evidence on the instrument‘s impact on people‘s long-term conservation 
commitment is still scarce. 
In conclusion, for REDD+ policies and measures to be effective, equitable and legitimate, there is a 
need to address tenure insecurity and conflicts and to understand what forest rights mean for different 
people under different forest tenure regimes, how they exercise their rights or why they fail to do so. 
The diversity of forest tenure systems in Latin America and across all developing countries implies 
that a ―one size fits all‖ approach to REDD+ is doomed. We are aware that organizing context-specific 
responses to land-use change and forest resource use is likely to lead towards increasing political and 
organizational complexity, as well as higher economic costs, but we are also convinced that this will 
maximize the chances for successful actions and resource users‘ long-term commitment to forest 
management and conservation. 
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